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Abstract
'1'hix patx;r studies an agcncy problem be[ween a bank and its loan officer in the prcxess of
loan origination. The loan officer privately observes a prospective borrower's yuality. A
high-risk bcxrower may offer a side transfer to the loan ofticer (collusion) to induce him)her
to understatc the borrower's risk when reporting to the bank owner. Thc bank, by involving a
crcdít committcc in thc loan appruval prcx;css, may prevcnt this prohlcm. Banks optimally sct
a loan limit abovc which all loans must be approved by the committee. Collusion may cxacur
in eyuilibrium only if the bank cannot precommit to thc probability that the credit committee
actually checks the loan ofticer's creclit proposal.
JT:L classification numbers: G21, D82, L23.
~ ABN AMRO Bank, P.O. Box 2R3, NI:1000 EA Amsterdam, The Netherlands. This paper
is a revised version of Chapter 4 of my PhD-thesis completed at CentER, Tilburg University,
"I'he Netherlands. 1 would like to thank Helmut Bester for his advice and helpful discussions.
The paper also benetitted from comments and suggestiuns by Arnoud Boot, )an Bouckaert,
Paul de Bijl, Eríc van Damme and Anjolein Schmeitz. I alone remain responsible for the
contents of the paper. 'I'he views expressed here are not necessarily those of ABN AMRO
Bxnk.Most US hank failures outside peritxls of severe economic depression can he attributed tu
uuc~rnu! t:auscs: thc failures, Ihat i.ti, wcrc causcd hy faUOrs or circumstances lhat compctcnt
lir huncst managcrs and dircctors wttuld havc prcvcnlcd or avuidcd (sct: tiinkcy (1979, p. 17)).
'I'he internal causes include, ~unong uther things: Improper luans tu "insiders" such as
rclativcti, husincss asxtx;iatcs Ilr Irit:nds,~ mana~crial wcakncsscs in loan-purtfolio
supcrvision, lack of protx:r audits, controls and syslcros, liberal h:nding pracliccs and
overlending, excessive tinancial statement and collateral dtxumentation exceptions and fraud
(scc Ilill (1975), Oftice ot the Cumptroller ot thc Currency (198R), Sinkey (1979, 1992),
Williams et ul. (1991)). Sinkey (1992) concludes that among those responsible for the
depusit-insurance dehacle are the managers of insured depositories, who did a poor job ot
monitoring their employees and their borrowers. Also highly rated banks may sometimes
sufter from too lax lending criteria and insufficient checks in the lending system.z
Given these observations, and given that -- as predicted by economic theory (e.g.
lliamond (1984)) -- many banks are largc organizations, internal incen[ive problems
asscx;iated with the bank's credit function havc received relatively little attention in the
mcxfern theory of tinancial intermediation under asymmetric information.' It seems important
to improvc the understanding of how banks organizc their lending activities.
This paper fcxuses on an agency problem between a bank and its loan otficer in the
prcxess of loan urigination. Banks hire loan officers to operate as "salesmen" in Iocal credit
markets, unlike in Broecker (1990), where the bank principal himself is involved with loan
origination. Generally the luan ofticer knows more about the borrower than does any other
individual in the bank bccause of hislher critical role in the solicitation and negotiation of the
~ AccurJin~ tu I Iill (1975) tbis cauxccl 3H oul uf 67 Uti hank failures bctwccn IrX~ll :{nd 1974. A rccent non-Uti
cxamplc ix a hankcr pilfering S 21Nhn-70nm trom the fi,urth-biMext linanaial gruup in Mexiu~ dtriwgh fraudulent loans,
liillowcd hy Ihc Mexican governmcnt taking uver this gruup to rcuxuc it (7ire Ernnurni.cl, Scpt. lOth 1994, "Cabal
tniuhlc").
`"I'hc cullapxe ul the Schtx:iJer real cslate empire in Germany is a recent example. Set: Der Sjrie~e( 17, 1994,
"Priigcl fur dcn Primus," atxl 77te~ firunnrni.cl, April 16th, 1994, "Otx: o(uur tyawns is missing-"
j ltdcll's (19H9) cmpirical pa~r iti an cxccplion, lix:using un (tx~xt-appruval) luan monituring. Nakamura (199i)
mcnliunx thc intcrn:rl agcncy prublcm ass~x:iatcJ with Icndin~. nuhun :uxl Dcwalri~ml ( 1991) apply Radtxr's (1993)
nnxlel ol decentraliza:d infiirmation pnx:exsing w fin:uxial intennedi:uion. A related lilerature considerx :rgetx:y
pruhlcros hctwcen a h~nk managcr :uxl thc hnnk uwrx~rs. Mcslcr ( 1989) givcs rn uvcrvicw ot cmpiricxl work in this
:vca. Mcucr ( 1991) presents empirical evidetx:e un the czistetxe ol such a problem in tlx xavingx and loans (S8t1.)
indu~try. Ilcnnalin arxt Wallacc ( 1994) simultarxuusly cunsiikr thix agcrny problcm rnd an agctx:y pruhlcm txxtwccn
sharchrdJcrx :md dchilrrldcrx in Ilx ti8cl. itxht~lry.lu:tn (Uclcll (19R9)). 'fhis implics Ihat thc loan ollicer, more than any olher bank employcc, is
in thc fxsf pusiliun hr asscss thc t'i.tik of a pnupcctivc hcrrrowcr. Ncvcrlhclcss, anecdotical
evidence suggests that loan ofticers may have a tendency to underestimate borrower risk.'
There are two explanations: (a) The loan ofticer's persona! involvement with the borrower
may skew objec[ivity (Altx;rl (1993), h'inunciu! Times' (14 Sept. 1993), f'inczncieele Dugblad
(1 March 1991), Pirok (1993)). (b) The (career) incentive .rystem for loan ofticers focuses
more on new lending activities than on project pertbrmance (Drake (1993), Kilby (1993),
Sinkey (1992)).s With regard to the incentive system, the bank could make the loan ofticer's
wagc contingent on the profit [hat is ultimately earned on the loan (see Holmstrom (1979) and
Shavell (1979)). It may be costly to do so, however, for several reasons. Risk aversion on the
part of the loan ofticer is one. Also if the loan ofticer is risk-neutral, as in this paper, placing
high emphasis on project performance may be costly. [f the performance of the loan depends
not only on the loan otticer's eff~,rt in project selection, but also on effi,rts made by other
pe:rsons providing advisory or monitoring services, it may be difficull to determine whether
project fàilurc is the loan officer's fault. Moreover, the ultimate protit of granting a loan is
usually realired only after a relatively long period of time. The loan officer is free to quit
hislher job bef~,re debt repayment is due, or may pass away. A(legal) limited liability
cons[raint and insufticicnt loan officer wealth (after consumptive needs have been satistied)
may prevent negative wages. The practical observation that the incen[ive system for loan
ufficers often focuses more on new lending activities than on project performance, seems to
indicate that the costs of paying loan otticers contingent an loan perti~rmance may t,e higher
than the henelits. Given this incentive structure, this paper ti,cuses on the effect of thc loan
officer's pcrsunal relationship with the borrower on the luan ofticer's actions.
4 ticc c.g. Allx:rt (1993), llrakc (IrXI3), l.ïnnnrird Times (14 Scpt. 1993, "Brit,e:ry, tx'gligetxe :uxl frauJ wsl
Ilun~,ari,m banks 4 170,~."), tl.n. Langr~an int~rvi~w~J ny l.ï,rrr„~~,-~~le 1)u~hlud (I March li~l, "tiullatxLu banyue
d'afl:rires tnsscn dr~x,m rn daad"), Kilby (1993), Pirnk (1993) atxl Sinkcy (1992). In a wurst-ca.u~ uxcnaria, thc intcgrity
id thc I~nding rtaau„ntihi~ t~ay fx vnhx:rahf~. tr, ~„rr,r~ut,n it tn~ luan ufliccr rcecivcx kickbacks ur has an utxliulused
linauci:d inlcrc.el in thc M,rruwinE corx:cnts. Ax an cxamplc, thc lvnnnriul Ïimr,c (14 Scpt. ItX)3) rc~,rls: "Britx;ry,
tKgligctx:c alkl IraUtl cuct Ilun~arian haukx S 170n,. L.I Bank managerx are alleged tu have accepted brit,es tu
wtJerscure credit risk, uverla,k laked security or Eranl prelerenlial luans." Udell (1989) retnarkx tha[ while this tY3,t~ uf
Ixh:rviur cenainly d~ns uot characterir.e a large fractinn ol'cummercial loan relatiunehips, it Joes xeetn ~, characterize a
signitieant tractiun nf Utnu banks that have (ailed.'fu model this cffecl, 1 assumc that the personal relationship bcaween borrower and loan
ulfïct:r may involve sume hidden side transfer, such as cummon interests in the Ickal
community, 1'riendship, horrower eftiirt to convince thc loan ofticer to grant the loan, and (in
extreme cases) non-monetary or munetary hrihes. An (unprofitable) low-yuality borrower
may cullude with the loan uf~ticer. In exchange liir a side transfer, the loan ofticer may hide
unfavorable infurmation atxwt the horrower, such that -- based on thc intiirmation that is
presented to the principal -- the bank woutd decide to grant a loan.`'
The paper analyzes the bank's optimal (i.e. profit-maximizing) policy of coping with
cnltusion. Thus, it is related to the theory of (collusion in) organiTations, see e.g. Kofman
and Lawarrée (1993, KBcL hereatter), Lalfont and Tirole (1991) and "I'irole (1992). In this
literature, the role of a"sutx:rvisor" is to reduce the asymmetry of intixmation between the
principal and the agent. Consider now the borrower to be the agent; the role of this
supervisor is then played by the loan ofticer. However, the possibility of collusion induces a
principal-agent problem between the loan ofticer and the principal. The loan ofticer may
therefore be supervised by another supervisor, which can be referred to as the credit
commi[[ee~credit departmenL If such a credit committee is involved, it makes the credit
decision after having received a report by the loan ofticer containing information about the
borrower. It may perfbrm a costiy check of this report, which reveals whether collusion has
occurred.' The credit commit[ee is an ineorruptible supervisor, as in Baron and Besanko
S
Acrnriling, tu Kilby (I~K)31, al Icasl until rcccntly thc Icnding pna:cxs within thc Worltl Rank cuulJ Fx:
lI1:I1:ILtCr1lt'tI :Iti such.
`' 'fwo rcmarkx rogarding tiidc tranxlcr~ anJ cullusiun: (il titlnK ul thc cxamplcs ut siJc transters given in the lext,
sudt as Iwxruwcr cllirrt to intluctkc lhc Inan ulliccr, arc Iwt rcally transfcrs oi ulility. lu tJrc cuntext uf this pa~Cr thcy
c;ut still Ix: Iatx;IleJ side transfers il the Mtrrnwer F1eaf} a eUtil In Uflll'f 10 aÍICCI lhl' luan ufticec (ii) tYote lhat side
translcrs may have itxentive peKitive ctlects as well, if they motivatc loan ufticcrx to invest high efl-ort in Ietxling. This
is in lilx with Altxrt'x (1993) Irhticrvaurm mat in ~racuee many uf thc elententti thxt nwtivatc an account oftícer are
im~ucd hy cxtcrnal lacturs. "fhis pa~r rx;gkctx xuch ~trsilivc itx;cnlivic ellccts. Scc scctiun S tirr a discussiun.
y Van Jcn Rrink (19R1, Ch. 9) dcscritxs wha[ kintl u1' intixmatiun such a rc~xt xhould cunUin. In practicc, in
aJJitiun tu chccking Utc repnrt the crcdit cummittec may alxo serve anudter goal (see e.g. Pirok (1993)): To improve thc
credit decixiun Fy brin~ing in intivmatiun that tM: luan ofticer ikkx t1tH have. ~ltis may cotx;ern indus[ry-s(xcitic arul
macro-cculxrmic inlirrntatiun, prcvilrus cx~Crícnces with similar Mrrrowcrs in otlur rcgiun~, intirrmation aMrut tltc
hauk'ti a.~sctti mix such as the exten[ ofdiversiticaliun uf [he luan )xrrttidiu over geugrxphic regiuati atxl intlus[ry cuclurs,
ildunnation aMrut tlx cust Id' twxLt, ctcctcra. tiae u-caion 5 lirr a diu uxsiun.4
(1984) and thc cxtcrnal auditor in KBcL, tiir instancc bccausc it is located far away at thc
head-oftice, where the borrower has no access to it.x
Alterna[ively [he credit decision may tx: delega[ed to the loan ofticer. Collusion may be
prevented if the loan ofticer's wage scheme is such that collusion does not make him~her
hetter off. In that case the loan ofticer's wage will increase with the maximum side transfer
that the horrower is ablc to pay in urdcr to prevent collusion. Other than in most of the
cullusion literature (e.g. KBcL, 't'irole (1992)), this maximum side transfer increases with the
investment IcveL So the cost of preventing cullusion [hrough delegation increases with thc
loan siu I.
Tu cope with collusiun, the bank has to choose tx~tween either delegating the credit
decisiun to thc loan ufhcer or involving the credit committee. The model indicates that alxwe
some investment level it is cheaper to involve the credit committec at tixed cost per check
than to delegate the credit decisiun tu thc loan officer, because the cost of delegatiun increases
with the loan size. '1'his may explain the practical ohservation that banks typically sct a limit
aMive which all loans must be approved by a credit committee. Udell (1989) reports that 84oh
of banks in a survey approve loans based on a credit committee limit.
Wilson (1991) s[udies a nu~del in which a tirm's top management wants a projec[ selector
(agent) to sclect the value maximizing project. The agent's private henetits are assumed to he
inversely related to project quality, so the agent has an incentive to select a lower-quality
prciject. An important differcnce is that in my paper the agent's (i.e. loan ofticer's) private
txnelit associatcd with selecting a low-yuality horrower arises endogenously, in the Form of a
sidc transfer. In Wilson (1991) the lirm solves the moral hazard problem associated with
project selection by committing to a payout policy (debt service and dividend) that imposes a
relatively large drain on cash flows. 'I'hen the relatively high hurdle rate associated with
cxternal capital will be used to evaluate project continuation decisions, inducing the agent to
chcx~se a better project ex ante.
My paper also studies the ex post commitment prohlem that may be associa[ed with a
check by the credit cornmittee. As a result of this problem, collusion may occur in
x I Ju irtt cunsidcr Ux irxentive prnhlem in Sah arxl titiglitz (1986). "1'here Ihc luwer trureau in a hierarchy
:mticipates that the uptxer hureau will r~~axtk its decisiunv, ui ureening may Ixxconk Iess comervative. See zection 5.S
cyuilihrium. It will tx: shown [hat dclegating thc crcdil dccision lu lhc loan ot7iccr, which
implies ex ante cornmiunent not to involve the credit cummittee, may help to avoid the
wmmiunen[ problem. '1'hus, delegation may keep the bank from financing unprotitable
projects. 'fhe model underlines the view that better incentive mechanisms can otten be
designed within decentralized econumic systems (sce Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) and Sah
and Stiglitz (1986)).
Section 1 describes the basic mcxieL Section 2 studies the collusion game. Section 3
considers the case in which the principal can precommit to some prohability ot calling in the
credit committee. In sectiun 4 commitment is absen[. Section 5 discusses possible extensions
of the nuideL Section 6 concludes.
1. The model
The bank owner (principal), the loan ofticer and the credit committee together form a bank.
Borrowers demand bank loans. The principal, who seeks to maximize bank profit, owns the
t'unds to be lent out, hut is unabte to meet and monitor txirrowers directly. He delegates this
task to the loan officer. All agents are risk-neutral.
t3orrowers
There are many borrowers, who are endowed with projects. A project needs an initial
investmen[ of some exogenously given size 1 1 0. As the borrower does not have liquid
funds available, hc needs e bank loan of size L[n case ot investment, the project yields XI it
successful (constant returns [o scate) and zero if it fails. There are two types of borrowers. A
traction y of the borrowers is of the good type, wi[h success probability 0 G p~ G 1. A
traction 1-y is of the bad type, with success probabitity 0 G pn G p~. Define by R the
average success probability:
R-yPe f (t-y)Pi,
A bad borrower's project is assumed to be unprotitable. That is, phX G 1. On average,
projects are protitable: RX ~ 1."I'he loan ofticer and the information structure
"fhe luan officer represents the bank in the credit market. Her expected wage should at least
cyual her reservation utility w, which is normalized lo equal w- 0. The loan ofticer
randumly mcets prospective borrowers. To identify a borrower's type, she pertiirms a
costless but imperlèct test.~' Let the parameter l denote the probability that the test reveals the
borrower's typc. The titllowing tahle describes the test:
Goad borrower (~) Bnd óorrower (h)
Test resulL 'Guod' (G)
Test result 'Inconclusive' (0)




Only the loan ofticer and the borrower costlessly observe the test result. The loan ofticer
must report a signal L to the principal, L e{G,e,B}. Assume that the signal is hard informa-
~js2p. "Chat is, if a conclusive test resul[ is obtained by the loan ofticer (G or B) and the test
result is revcaled to [he principal, it is convincing evidence. Alternatively, the loan otticer
may hide the conclusive test result and report that the [est was inconclusive (0). If xn
inconclusive test result e is ohtained. the loan officer cannot report a cunclusive result; in that
casc thc luan ufticer must report L- 0. Thus, the loan officer has some discretion only if a
conclusive test result is ohtained.
' Allcrnativcly utx~ uwld asxutnc that d~c tcst iz coxtly arxl nlluw tlx: I~~an utliccr tu clxx~u wlxdx:r tn ctnpluy the
tezl at snme et7iin cost, ur twt tu empluy the test. See u;cliun 5 li~r a diu;ussiun.7
"I~he loan ofticer reporting an inwnclusive tes[ result can tx~ compared to the sc. ~condhand
car dcalcr in Shin (1994). Supposc you ask this dcalcr whethcr a sccondhand car you arc
considering buying has been in an accident, and the dealer then replies he does not know.
'1'his reply usually Ieaves opcn two possibilities. Lither the dealer knows that the car has bcen
in an accident but is holding back this intixmation, or the dealer is genuinely ignorant as to
whether the car has been in an accident.
"I"hc interprctation of the informatiun structure in terms of inti~rmation hiding assumes that
in vrder to tx: able to be conclusive about a prospective borrower's type, some tninimum
amount of inti~rmation is necessary. If the amount of intiirmation ubtained by the loan ofticer
is sufticient to draw a detinite conclusion, she may hidc part of i[. In that case the information
she presents to the principal is insufticient to be conclusive about the horrower's type. If thc
amount of inti~rmation availahle to the loan officer is insufficient to be conclusive, she is
unable [u create some extra false informa[ion that wcwld convince the principal of the
cipposite. ~u
Collusion
Given the luan ofticer's discretion atter a conclusive test result is found, ~~n may c~ccur.
That is, a borrower may ciffer a non-monetary side transfer s to the loan ofticer to induce her
tc~ hidc thc amclusivc cvidcncc and tu scnd an incunclusivc report ~ to Ihc principal instcad.~~
"fhe side Iransfcr is a private tx:netit to the loan officer. Unlike in Wilson (lc~l) this private
benetit arises endogenously.
~~~ 'I'hc tcchnic.il mulivaliuu I~a Ihis inli,rmaliuu swclurc ix iix rolc in simplifying tlk analyxis. It implics ihat ihc
prim;ipal may sutitxa wllusion unly ilthc luan olliccr has rctx,rtcd an im:u~x;lusivc tcst rcxult. II nc~ g,xxl signal wuuld
nut Ik hard infi,rm:nion, thcn alsu aflcr rccriving a gtxxl signal lh~ priixipal mi~ht sus~:ct colluxion. "Ihix wuuld atkl
;muthcr subgamc t„ ihc gAmc trec, which wnuld rxn tx~ futxlamcntally dil'Icrcnl from ihc casc cuntiidcrctl hcrc.
II
~Ihe M,rn,wcr is aesumed tu have unnr iw,n-m~metnry etxk,wnxnt I'rum which Ix; makez the side tratvcfer. The
:~sxumptiun uf nun-motxlary sidc tranxfers simplilics the analysi. in yet atx,ther way. If the sick transfir wiwld tx:
munclary. thc amount to tx; M,rrowcd wuuld dcpcncl on Jic sir~: ol lhc siJc transfcr. II thc dcm:uxled luxn siu wuuld
tiignal 1'uwrc cullusiun, lhc problem u(cullusiim wuulJ Jisapttlar in an mxunviix;ing way. 'I'hiv tx,xxibili[y xhould have
to Fx; n~lcd out if .eiJc tranefcrs would Fx: nx,cetary.x
"I'he luan ofticer's valuation of the side transfèr s eyuals as. Assume that 0 e cx C I,
where the assumption lx G I implies that collusion involves a dcadweight cost. The loan
ol~ticer values a wagc of one dullar highcr than a side transtcr of one dollar, perhaps because
she does not like to hide evidence or because she wants to be compensated for the risk of
being caught colluding. If collusion would be considered "morally ofljectionable," a low a
could Fx; interpreted as a high level of morality. The loan otticer will accept the offered side
transfer only if this makes hcr better off. Acceptance of the transfer implies, as in KBcL, that
the loan ofticcr abides by her commitment to hide intiirmation, although it is not possible to
enforce a side contract in court. Tirole (1992, p.156) discusses non-judicial mechanisms that
cnsure cntimceability of sidc contracts and concludes that the approach that assumes
enforceability as given "may offer a realistic description of side contracting, and that it still
yields precious insights when it does not."
"Che credit committee
The credit committee does not collude with anyone, as it resides in the bank's headoffice,
near the principal and far away from the local credit market.t`' Since a conclusive report is
hard infiirmation, only inconclusive reports will be sent to the credit committee. In that case
Ihe cummittee, which then makes thc credit decision, may perform a check of the loan
utticer's report at cost C, which is observed by the principal. If the borrower and [he loan
ol~ficer havc colluded, the check revcals this to the principal. Borrower and loan ofticer do
nut observe whcther thc credit committec perfixms a check or not. t'
IZ
II lhe ennuniuee itselr woulJ tx: involveJ in meeting txrrruwerx. it wuulJ alsu fx: extxued lu cullusiun. Moreuver,
I aisume the wage cust invnlveJ wíUi Ihe credit cnmmi[tec u:recning Mrrruwers dirlxUy lu Frc very high. Su the loan
ulticer is the more cnst e(licienl sulution tu the u:reening prohlem.
I? 'fhiti implies that Mrrrower atxl loan otlícer canlxx distinguixh Fxawn:n the cau: in which thl: committec hav lxrt
checked thc re~xl, ;uxl the r.rxe in which lhe committee has checked, hm cullusion did txri rx:cur. Conuyuenlly the
wagc will Ir.x Ihc xamc in lhcsc lwn caxcs, atxl srr will lhc inlcresl ratc.9
"I'hc hurnrwcr'ti rcp:rymcnl cihligalicrn rl is conlin}~cnl un Ihc ullimatc si~nal Ihat Ihc princip:tl
rcccivcs abuul thc bun-owcr. If lhc crcdit commiUcc dc,ls nut chcck, lhc ultimatc signal
comes from the loan ofticer's reporr otherwise it comes from the committee's check. lletine
hy rc; and r„ gross interest rates (repayment obligations per dollar of the loan) contingent on a
good and an inconclusive signal, respectively, where 1 G r~; G r„ G X. The borrower with
a bad signal does not receive a loan as loans to bad borrowers generate losses (pnX G l).
Take the rates r~; and r„ as exogenously given. An extended model may endogenize these
rates (through a model ot' bank competition, fbr example). Assume that rc; generates
nonnegative protit to the bank if it lends to gooci borrowers: rc; ? tlpx. Also assume tha[ r„ is
such tha[ if the loan offïcer has reported an inconclusive test result, it is protitable ti~r the
principal to grant a loan at interest rate r„ even if the borrower with a hxd tes[ result always
colludes and if this collusion is never detected:
(I-f~)(Rr~~- 1) -~ (1-q)I~(Pi,r„- I)?~ (1)
Here (1-I') is the traction of borrowers with an inconclusive test result; R is the average
success probability of the entire population of borrowers; and (I-q)I is the fraction of
borrowers that are of the bad type and have a bad test result. This condition is not essential
but simplifies the analysis, because it implies that whenever the bank reccives an inconclusive
test result, it will grant a loan.
The principal determines the loan ofticer's wage scheme w-(w~;,wt,,w„), which is public
information. Pollowing the reasoning in the intrcxluctory section, the principal cannot reward
the loan ofticer contingent on debt repayment by the borrower. The loan oftïcer's wage is
contingent on the report she sends to Ihe principal. If no collusion is detec[ed, w~;, wt~ and w„
denote the loan ofticers' wages contingent on a good, a bad and an inconclusive test report,
respectively. The loan ofticer's limited liability constraint requires wc;, wu, w~, ? 0. If
wllusion is detected, the loan officer does not receive her wage but is punished by an
exogenous nonpecuniary penalty P 1 0(e.g. dismissal).ta A(legal) limited liability
ta Alternativel n cuuld be acsumed dtat the rine:i al cuuld charse xume u timal P' in lhe interval p, pMnx
r r v~ r I I- tt iti
nut diltícult tu ~huw dtat then I' - I'Mnx Mxh in the commitment r.~tic (su;tion 3) anJ in the no-cotnmitment case
(sectiun 4).fo
constrainl fiir empkiyces hounds Y li~om aherve: P C C-r., ptherwise the collusion prohlem
wuuld ~isappcar trivially fiir P closc tu intinity.
'fiuiinf;
'I'hc scyucncc ut evcnts is as folluws.
I. The principal offers a contract specifying a wage scheme w and slxxcifying that the loan
utTicer will he punished hy the (exogenous) penalty P if collusion is detectt:d. If the
principal is able to precommit to some probability fi that an inconclusive report is checked
by the credit committee, also p is part of the contract (0 ~)x 5 1).
2. "fhc loan offïcer is randumly matched with one horrower and (costlessly) employs the test.
Luan officer and borrower jointly observe the result.
3. "fhe borrower may offcr a side [ransfer s to thc loan ofticer. The loan ofticer may accept
ur re,jcct s. 1)enote by rs, 0 ~ a~: f, u,e prnnanihty that she accepts it.
4. 'I'hc loan oftïcer reports a signal L to the principal. If she has accepted the side transfer s,
she abides hy her commitment to report L - e regardless of the tes[ result. Otherwise she
truly reports the test result.
5. If the principal receives an inconclusive report (J, - c~) and the probability ft that he calls
in the credit committee has not been contracted in stage 1 of the game, the principal may
engage the credit committee to pcrform a check, possihly using a mixed strategy Ec (0 S fi
`1)
6. Contracts are implemented.
2. The collusion game
Collusion may occur only if the loan ofticer has somc discre[ion, i.e. only if the loan ofticer
has ohscrved a conc;lusive [est result.
'fhe bad test result
If the luan ofticer has observed a bad test result, when will collusion occur'? Detitx; s(fx) as
Ihe highest side transfer tiie had borrower wíth a bad tcst result would tx; willing [o pay to theluan ol7iccr, given tc. 'Then sQc) must cyual the had borrower's expected gain from collusion.
Alier collusion, wjth probahility 1-tc the credit committee dcxs not check the loan officer's
report. Only then the borrower receives a loan 1, which enables him to invest I and earn
positive ex~C:cted protit. So wc have
s(tc) - (I-Fr)PnIX - r„11
Assume that the borrower with a bad lest result of~fers somc side transfer s s s(tc) to the loan
officer to hide the result. The loan ofticer rejects this offèr and truly reports the test result if
her wage when reporting the true result is higher than hcr payoff when colludíng:
wu ~ as f(I-tc)w„ - ti P (2)
'I'he side lransfer is accepled if the reverse holds. It (2) is an equality, the loan ofticer is
indifferent hGween accepling and rejectjng the sjde transfer.
Surpusc Ihat a had tcst resull has tx:cn obscrvcd and that collusiun cxcun. If lhc hank ducs
not detect collusion, the luan officer receives wage w,,. A higher w,,, thus, makes it more
costly for the bank to prevent or reduce collusion (see (2)). So preventing collusion is
chcapc;st for the hank if w„ - 0.
"hh~gocxl tesl resul[
It is not in the good horrower's interest that the loan officer hides a conclusive test result.
'1'hc good borrower will, therefore, not offer a side transfer to the loan officer to hide the
conclusive test result. Conversely, [he loan officer could threaten the hcxrower to hide the
good test result. 'Ihis threat, however, is not credible if wc; ~ w„. If w~ - w,,, the loan
~illicer will hc indilferent he[ween exccuting the threal and not doing so. As a[ic-breaking
rule, it will he assumed that the loxn ofticer truly reports the good test result in that case.~`
"1'he principal prevents collusion and at the same time minimizes wage cost if he sets w~ -
w,,. Combine this with the ubservation that w„ - 0 is the bank's best poticy if the loan officer
would observe a bad test result, to obtain the equilibrium condition
wc-w„-~ (3)
~ 5 l-~~ jusiify this nile, rnNC thal rny arhilrarily small iixrease ut w~; ur a small pn~M1ability uf heing cltu.keJ wcwW
resull in Ihc ti:unc Jï~ïision.12
'fn minimir.e bank ccist, this condition must hold. Givcn that (3) holds, collusion may cwcur
~mly if thc loan ut7íccr ohticrvcs a had tcst rcxult.
In this nuxlel -- where the loan otiicer only meets one txirrower -- thc loan uf~ticer's wage is
positive only if a bad project is reported. Suppose that in an extended model the loan ofticer
would have the opportunity to meet more horrowers hetiire she picks une. "I'hen if (3) would
hold, it might be the case that the loan ofticer woulJ continue searching until she would have
founJ a bad borrowcr. To prevent this type of adverse behavior, the hank should then raise
w,; tc~ induce thr loan ul~ficer to pick a good borrower whcn she meets one. In that case (3)
would not hold, but instead wc; ~ w,,.
'1'hc collusiorLS'~tis~
As a point of reference the paper will now hriefly examine the case in which the bank does
not prevent collusion between the borrower with a bad test result and the loan ofticer.
('ollusion will thcn ckcur whcnever a bad test result is found. Thc hank's expected loss on
horrowers with a bad test result eyuals (1-y)I'(pnr~, - 1)t, which is negative by phX G l. In
this case the bank's expected profit eyuals:
n - RI ~- (I-cl) I-(Pi,r„- 111 (4)
where RI is Ihe expected payoff to the bank on borrowers that do not collude, that is, those
borrowers with gocxi or inconclusive test results."' By (1) , bank profit (4) exceeds zero. This
implies that by assumption the bank will always be ahle to adopt a policy such that lending is
profítable. The yuestion is, how much more the bank could earn when efticiently coping with
collusion. '1'he paper will show that reducing collusion may signiticantly increase bank protit.
3. Contractible checking
'I'his section assumes that the prohability p that the credit committee checks an inconclusive
rcport is contractible. That is, ti is chosen as part of the contract hetween the principal and
ie
It 4t (PK4, t) f( t-t )(Dr,~ I).13
Ihe Itlan of~ticer in swge 1 of the game and the principal sticks to this contrac[.~' The principal
picks the combination (ti, wit) that maximizes bank proti[. First it will be shown that in this
casc thc principal will always prcvent collusion.
:t~l.s.i~llusi~n--0rUS~lns~s
n strategy is 4ullusion-pruuf if it always prevents collusiun. Collusion Jcxs certainly not
ex;wr if [he maxitnum side transfer s(tl) that thc had borrower would be willing to pay, is
insufticient to make the loan officer better off colluding. In this case of commitment to tl, if
the luan ofticer is indifferent between accepting the side transfer or not, we usc the tie-
hreaking rule that she rejects the transfer. collusion dcxa not occur.~" Substitu[ing s by s(tl) in
(2) anJ using (3) yields the collusion-proofness constraint:
wti ? as(tt) - tl P (5)
If the collusion-proofness constraint (S) halds, no side transfer that the borrower would be
willing to pay could induce the loan uftïcer tu hiJe a baJ test resul[. Detine wB(tt) as [he
value for wt, such that the collusion-prcxifness constraint is exactly binding if this value is
nonnegative; it this value would be negative, wH(tt) is reru:
wri( ft) - max~ us(tt) - uP : 01 (6)
If the collusion-proofness constraint (5) is binding, the bank's expected protit equals
n - RI - ( I -I') IlC - ( I -q) I ~wn~( tt) (7)
where (I-I')ttC is the expecteJ cost of involving lhe crcdit commit[ee.
A tiimple collusion-proof strategy tix the bank is setting (wli, tl) -(w~(0),0). This strategy
prevents cullusion without involving the credit committee. Comparing (4) and (7) yields that
this simple collusion-prcxif strategy generates higher bank protit than allowing collusion, by
(6), u C 1 and p~,X G t.'I'he bank will therefiirc always use a collusion-proof contract (wH,
tl) in lhe commitment case. The collusion-prcxifness wnstraint (5) will he satistied in
equilibrium.
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In secrion 4 we dixcusx the wnunitmenl pruMem atiawialeJ widt chuking. A repuWlion nx~:hanixm may prevent
thi~ prohlem. In a repeated game, rx:w M~rruwerx anrld Icarn whetlx;r lhe credit committec checks with tfx contracted
pruhahility rr ur ixit. II nut, thc bank luus thc repul:rlian fur t,ling wugh nn culluxiun.
~~'fu justily this rulc, rwtc thal any arbitrarily xmall itx;rca.a: in w~r ur tt wuuld gctx:ratc tlx xank rxnconx.la
3.2. (1~limal strateev
It has M:cn shown that an optimal conlract Oc,wi{) will hc; such that thc collusion-pnxifncss
cunstraint (S) is satislicd. Givcn thal (3) holds in cyuilihrium, lhc principal's prohlcm is lu
maximirc hank prolit (7) suhjcct lu wi, ~ U(loan ofticcr's limitcd liability and individual
ratiunality constraint) and 0 - tc - I.'I'u state the next Proposition, detine
l, - (I-I'Í('-(I-q11'~~
(I-y)I ~cc hn(-K-ri,)
and )c~ - wi~t(~)I(wi~~(~) f P)
Nutc that 0 G ti G 1.
(x)
Pruposition 1: ~ts.rtcnte thut the prinripn! is uble tu commit to ~. In cyuiliórium tite princ~ipa!
r-hun.res u pulic.~~ Iftat prevettt.~~ c~o!lre~inn. The uptimal policy Ls [hefollnwin~:
a) l~I~ I'. tlte princ~ipa! optimnllv pirk.c tc' - 0 und wti' - wtr(O) ~ 0.
h) I) I, l~, the pc-int~i~ul c~r[irnct!!v pirk.r Ic' -)t~ uncl wti' - 0.
'I'he principarsprnFt i.rposilive und increusin); in 1.
PL~ See Appendix.
Proposition I states that if lhe hank is able to commit to Fc, it prefers to prevent collusion.
'I'he credit committec will tx: involvcd (li 1 0) nnly with relatively large loans (I ~ I'). If thc
loan size is ~maller, the principal prefcrs no check Qc - 0) ancí delegates the credit decision
to the loan ufficer. The intuition ti~r this result is as tiillows. The side transfer that the
horrower is willing to pay increases with the investment level I. As a result, the cost of
preventing collusion if the credit commit[ee is not involved (p - 0) increases linearly with I,
as the bank pays expe;cted wage ( I-y)I'wii(0) to the loan officer to prevent collusion.
Alternatively the bank commits to some probability ti of checking the inconclusive report in
combination with paying rero wage tu the loan ofticer. [n tha[ case preventing collusion
involves expected cost (1-I')Ei'C. "1'his cost also increases with the loan size I, because the
prohability ti' of a check is increasing in L The larger the loan, the higher the maximum side
transfer s(Et) in case of collusion, which reyuires a higher probability (i of checking to15
prcvent cullusion. ttowever, thc cost ( I-I~)tiC is upwardly houndcd hy tc~ G 1. Therefirre
ahove some critical investment level t~ it will tx; cheaper tn involve the credit committee than
to delegate the credit decision to the loan officer. Thus, the proposition gives a theoretical
explanation firr a situation that is yuite common in practice: Many hanks grant their loan
oFficen a"credit limit" 1', such that the credit decision is delegated to the loan officer if [he
amuunl of Ihc luan is smalkr lhan I~, whercas Ior loans larger than I~ the credit decision is
made centrally, hy the credit committce (see c.g. Udell ( 19R9)).
If the cost of a check is suf~ticiently low, C 5(1-y)I'Pl~l-1'~, the critical credit limit h is
smaller than zero. In that case for all investment levels I ~ 0 the credit decision is made at a
centralized level (tcx - tt~Í.
4. Contract incompleteness
This section assumes contract incompleteness in the sense that the principal is unable to
commit to fc. In that case a commitment prohlcm may arise because ex post (that is, after
having reccived an inconclusive test report) the principal may want to reduce the cost of
checking. "l~his implies lhat in eyuilihrium the probabili[y tc must he subgame-pertèct, that is,
it must bc the principal's optimal choice ufter he has received an inconclusive report.
In this casc bank protit will not tk higher than in the commitment case of section 3. "I'he
rcctscm is lhal in thc a~mmitmcnt casc lhc principal always has thc option to chcxrsc lhc
uutcome of the no-armmitment case, but not vice versa.
4 l. Dele~tion to avoid the commitment problem
'I'he commitment problem assoc,iated with tr does not exist if setting Fc - 0 is optimal, as in
Proposi[ion I, part a. Indced, in stage 5 of [hc game the principal then knows that collusion
has not occurred and so he minimius his cost by not calling in the credit committee. To
avoid the commitmen[ problem concerning fr, the principal can thus prevent collusion by
setting wa - wR(0). The credit committee will not be involved (tc - 0) and the credit
decision is delegated to the loan ofticer.4.2. Involving the credit committee
'fhis section considers only Ihose eyuilibria in which the credit committee will Ix: involved
with positive probability p~ 0, which implies w„ c wii(0) (otherwise tc - 0 in
eyuilihrium). Given Ix ~ 0, now consider the fxirrower's dccision as to which side transfer to
offer, if any; the loan ofticer's decision whether to accept it; and the principal's decision
whether to check an inconclusive report. Using backward induction, start with the principal's
decision to check an inconclusive report in stage 5 of the game.
Ïhe ~irinc~ipul. Atter the principal has received an inconclusive report, ti - 1 will never
constitute an eyuilibrium. "fhe reason is that the collusion-prcwfness constraint (5) is satistied
tix tc - I, so collusion dces not occur. Then the principal prefers not to monitor (ti - 0),
which contradicts the choice to monitor with probability tc - 1. So in eyuilibrium ti G l.
After the principal has received an inconclusive report, he must in equilibrium be
indifferent bctween a check of the report, involving cost C, and no check. Given that the
horrower with a bad test result has colluded with lhe loan of~ticer with probability c~, the
principal calculates the following conditional probability fi(cs) that collusion has oeeurred:
(;(~) ' Il-y)I `~
(I-I')t(I-y)I'cs
If collusiun has occurrcd, a check ensures tha[ the loan will not Fx; gran[ed. In the absence of
a chcck, thc loan is granted hy assump[ion ( I), so the check may prevent a loss of (p~,r„ I)I G
0. "I'he condition [hat the principal is indifferent fxaween a check of [he inconcausive report,
invulving a cost C, and no check, is then given hy:
li(cT)(1 Pi,r„)1 - C (9)
Of coursc, condition (9) may tx~ satistied only if a check is useful in case cs - l:
C c B(1)(1 - phr„)I
so only if
I ~ li-1f~(I)(1-Pnr~,)~~C (10)
If condition ( 10) does not hold, a check is too costly relative to the size I of the loan. The
principal prefers not to use the credit committee, but instead moves to prevent collusion by
choosing w„ - wg(0). Thus, the restriction of this section to consider only those equilibria
with tt 1 0, implies that (10) must hold.




Note thal if ( 10) holds, une has 0 G cr C L ci is inc;reasing in C and decreasing in 1.
Ïhc loun njfrer: Af[er thc luan ufticer has observed a had test result, the situation in
which she strictly prefers to accept the bribe s oftcred by the bad txirrower (a - f) cannot
constitute an eyuilibrium. The reason is that then the principal would have the incentive to
check the loan ofticer's report with probability fr - l. The loan officer anticipates this; cs -
1 is thus not hcr txst choicc.
If she would chcxise a - 0, the principal would prefer no check Qc - 0). This contradicts the
astiumption of this section to cunsider eyuilibria with fc 1 0.
"I'herefure if )r 1 0 in cyuilihrium, [hc luxn oftícer must hc indifferent betwcen accepting and
rejecting [he side transfer s, given w,s, tr and P:
wH - as - tr P (12)
Ïhe fiorrower rvith u bud test resuh: Whenever the size of the side transfer s is such that
(12) hulds tirc s c s(fc), the borrower would raise s by any arbitrarily small amount such that
the loan ofticer would stricdy prefer to accept the bribe (a - 1). This dces not constitute an
cyuilibrium, as explained. "I'he hormwer will stop raising s when the transfer equals the
maximum transfer s(ti) that the borrower can afford:
s - s(p) (]3)
tn cyuilibrium ( 13) must hold; the borrower is thus indifferent between offering the
eyuilibrium side transfer s- s(fc) and not offering it. Note that fr - fr~ (see (8)) solves
(12)and ( 13) for w„ - 0.
43 The R['incipal's oRtimal ~I~ic~y in~sh ge t: the wage decision
'fhe principal determines the borrower's wage strvcture w in stage 1 of the gamc. With
regard to wc, and w,,, condition (3) holds in eyuilibrium. With regard to w„ (the wage if the
loan officer sends a bad test result) the principal has two options. The tirst option, described
in suhseclion 4.1, is to chcxue w„ - w,{(0). In that case even if the credit committee is not
involved (tr - 0), [he principal prevents cvllusion (a - 0) by (5). The second option,1K
dexcrihed in subsec[ion 4.2, is to pick wK C wt,r(0) and allow for some collusion. Which of
the two options maximizes the principal's payoff?
I~uposition 2: ~1.csume thut the prinr~ipul i,c not able tn r~ammit tn tt 1 0. There exists u
uniyue rritirul loun si2e Iz 1 mrciJi,l~J a~urh thut the prinripal's optimul po[iry c~un he
r~hurur7eri;edas.foUow.r:
rr) !j1 S 17 . the principaluptimally pickc we` - tivH(0), so tt' - 0. Collusion does not orrur.
h) I(1 1!z , the principul optimully picks wrr` - 0 G w~(0), so tt' - tt~. A bad borruwer
with u hud test result culludes with the loun njficer with probubi[iry cr: whcre 0 C á S l.
In rase ujc~nllusinn, the eyuilihrium side trun.~fer.ratisfes s' - s(tt~).
'I'he prinripul's prnfit is positive and increasinK in 1.
' i ~ ~ See Appendix.
Like Proposition 1, Proposition 2 is also in line with the practical observation that banks
typically set a loan limit above which all loans must he approved by the credit committee. An
important dihference with Proposition I, however, is that in the incomplete contract case
collusion cxcurs in eyuilibrium if the credit committee is involved Qt - ti). The principal has
the optiun to prevent collusion by delegating the credit decision [o the loan ofticer.
Neverthcless, for I~ l~, allowing some collusion in combination with a check by the credit
committee is more protitable fix the principal than would he preventing all collusion by
delegating [he credit decision to the loan officer.
"I'he parameter space where delegation is optimal is larger in the notommitment case than
in the connnitment cxse. ~~r The absence of commitment favors delegation. "fhe reason is that
delegation serves as a commitment device against collusion. It helps to prevent unprofitable
projccts From ever being undertaken.
Also in Dewatripont and Maskin (1990) delegation may serve to commit against tinancing
unprotitaMc projects. The reason is very different, however. Dewatripont and Maskin (1990)
consider a model of adverse selection in which it may become seyuentially optimal [o
t~'I'his is in litx wílh a result by Khalil atxl lawarrée (IrXJ4), wixr show that tln ahunce ufcommitment ~iwer to
an :wJitin~ stratcgy da:reau:x tlx rcwrnti Irum audi[ing to Un: pritxipal.)9
retinancc pr~ijects Ihat are ex ante unprotitahlc nnce thcy have Fxxgun. In a decentralired
ccunumy. thc crcdil dccisiuu is iuadc by sntall hanks. I)cccnUalizaliun ot crcdit ntay scrvc as
a commitment device against retinancing tx, ~cause the small bank may Ite unable to extend the
additiunal credil itself, once the project has pertbrmed badly in the initial perictd.
Decentralization may thus sulve a'soft hudget constraint' problem, and may prevent
unprotitahle prcijects from ever tteing undertaken. Both Uewatripetnt and Maskin (19c~) and
Ihis mctdel may underline the view that hetter incentive mechanisms can ol'ten be designed
within Jccentralized econumic systems (see Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) and Sah and Stiglitz
(1986)).
"fhe ntcxlel cuntributes tu the theory of collusion in several ways. Pirst, it dcx;s not derive
the principal's optimal pulicy in tenns of the side transfer technology or the auditing
technology, but in terms of project size. Second, it shows that even in the absence of
cummitment to tc, there exists a critical project sirx such that chec:ks will take place also if
cullusion involvcs luw deadweight cost. This as oppctsed to a resul[ by Khalil and lawarrée
11994), where in the ahsence of commitment to an auditing stra[egy no audits take place if
collusion involves sufticiently low deadweight cost. Third, in this mctdel the threat of heing
punished if awght colluding providcs an incentive titr truth-telling, as in KBcL and Khalil and
I,awarrce (1994). It is ditferent, however, with regard to the yuestion of who may be
punished. In [his mctdel the principal cannot punish the horrower (i.e. the agent who offers
thc hribc:), as it secros strange to allow a bank to punish a borrower outside of bankruptcy.
"1'he principal can only punish the agent who accepts the bribe (the Ioan officer). In K8c1, and
Khalil and Lawarrée (1994), the agcnt who may offer the bribe (the manager) can also be
punished by the principal, [o prevent this agent from shirking his job. The maximum bribe
that this agent is willing to pay rncreases with the penalty imposed on him when shirking. In
my mctdel the maximum brihe; depends on the bad bctrrower's expected project return and on
thc prohability of heing checked, which decreases with the penalty impctsed on the loan
ofticer when caught colluding.
Compare Propositions 1 and 2. In txtth cases the principal may choctse the same policy (ti,
wi,) -(ti, 0). There is an important difference, however, between the equilibrium in the
cr,mmitment case (Fropctsition 1, part b) and in the no-commitment case (Proposition 2, part20
h). In case of commitment, collusion dues not excur in eyuilihrium. If it would occur, the
principal wuuld ixx txater crft incrcasing tc~ hy an intinitely small amciunt, thus prevcnting
ccrllusion. If cummiuncnt is ahscnt, collusion cxcurs in cyuilibrium with positive probability
a- ci. If collusion would nevcr cx:cur, ex post it would he optimal tiir the principal tu lower
tc tu zero -- and thus no eyuilibrium would cxist.
5. Model extensions
"I'his secticm discusses some of the assumptions of lhe mcxiel, and suggests directicros for
futurc rescarch.
'fhis papcr maintains the simplifying assumpticm that the cullusive agreement is enforceable.
An alternative approach would trace the founda[ions of enforceability [o repeated interaction
and reputation. Tirole (1992) expects that many insights obtained with the enfiirceahility
approach will carry over to sclf-c:nforcing side contracts. Still, it would he interesting tu make
thc mcxlel rnulti-period, and lo study [he ti~llowing [rade-off. If a loan ofticer wciuld servc
many pericxls, hcr knowledge ahuut the Icx;al (prospec[ive) borrowers incrcases. "Ihis makes
it pussihle fiir her to analyre morc credit proposals in one period than could a Iess-
cxpcrienced loan officer. On the other hand, multi-txriocl relationships hetween a loan ofticer
and a hurrower may result in collusivc hehavior. There might be some optimal length of time
to the loan ofticer - horrower relationship.
7'he loan ofticer's eftbrt
In this paper the loan officer's el7i~rt is irrelevant fiir the type of txirrower she discovers.
Moreover, collusion may only harm, not henetit, the principaL An alternative model cuuld
allow the side transfer to have a Ixuitive incentive effect as welL If a side transfer would
motivate the loan officer tu invest high effort in the generation of business, the transfer might
also tx gexxl tbr the principal. This would favor Jelegation. Thus, there might be a trade-c~ff
hetween the positive (incentive) aspect and the negative (collusive) aspeca of side transfers.zt
Morcovcr, the prospe:ct of tx;ing checked might negativcly affect the loan ofticer's
inccntivc to cxcrt high cffort, as in Aghion and "E'irolc (1994) and Sah and Stiglitz (1986).
'1'his wuuld also I'avor delegation. In this case it is interesting that the role of' the loan ufticer
(the corruptible supervisor) cumhines the rulcs of KXcE.'s manager (prcxJuction) and their
internal auditor (supervision). En an extension of KBrL, if checking the internal auditor would
dcpress his efti~rt level, this would have only an indirect effect on production (for which the
manager is responsible). En my mexlel the bank's output (loan production) might he directly
aftcctcd.
[he intbrmational role of the credit commi[tee
"I'he credit committec (supported by its staft) is one of the places where the bank's private
intiirmation is collected and stored. This infiirmation plays an important role in the literature
Ihat views hank debt as 'insidc debt' (sce e.g. E:ama (1985), James ( 1987), Sharpe (1990) and
Rajan ( 1992)). I ignore this rulc by making the simplifying assumption that all the relevant
informxtiun lu asscss loan yuality and profitability that is available within the bank is known
alsu to the loan ofticer. The task of the credit committee is then to prevent or at least to
reduce collusion.
IEowever, introducing the informational role of the credit committee could have interesting
implications. Suppose that after checking the loan ofticer's report the credit committee has
beater inti~rmation than the loan ofticer, hecause it has access to more sources of information
than the loan officer. En that case detecting collusion may be more difficult. If the check
reveals that the txirrower should have been rejected, either collusion may have occurred or
thc loan ofticer may not have had the information necessary to draw this conclusion. Then the
loan ofticer may, after having reccived a bribe, still pretend to the credit committee that she
had insufticient informatiun t~i t~e conclusive.
Alternative aonlications of the model
Loum m~nitnrin~: 'fhe bank's credit function consists of two components: loan origina[ion
and loan monitoring. Loan origination includes loan officer effort in soliciting and negotiating
the new loan, pre-approval credit analysis conducted by the loan officer and the creditJepartment, and scrutiny hy those vested with credit approval authority. I,oan monitoring, un
the uther hanJ, consists of pu.rt-approval credit analysis in order to de[ect deterioration in
loan yuality (sec lldell (19R9)). "1'he patx:r presents a nuxiel of luan origination. With some
nxxlilicatiuns, huwcvcr, thc mcKJcl may Ix; applicablc lu Ioan monitoring as wcll. ln thc loan
review prc~cess, one could imagine the borrower paying a side transfer to the loan ofticer to
kcep the loan officer from reporting project deterioration. In tha[ case the model may give a
theoretical justitïcation tirr Udcll's (1989) empirical resul[s indicating that the true purpose of
commercial luan revicw is to address an agency prohlem Ixtween a hank and its commercial
loan ofticcn.
Munu~;eriul inc~entive prob[e~m.~~: Incentive problems hctween the management and the
sharcholdcrs uf a tirm may he analyzcd using a nxxiel in which a manager and the employees
uf a linn collude against lhc interests of the shareholders. Collusion may explain why
managcrs may hang on to projccts thxt should tx; divested in the interest of value
maximization. "I'his is an alternative to the explanation given by Bcx~t (1992) where a manager
may he reluctant to divest hecause a divestiture may Ix: interpreted as an admission that he
made an inaprropriatc project choice.' `~~
"fhc mcxlcl may also he applicd to, liir instancc, purchasing managcmcnt. A company (thc
principal in our mexieq could employ a purchasing manager (the loan ofticer) to test a
rnxiuct's yuality. Thc purchasing manager might he britx;d by [hc seller (the borrower) tu
overstatc the yualily of the project.
6. Conclusion
In the recent literature on banking under asymmetric information, agency problems within the
hank havc received litde a[tention, despi[e the fact [hat in practice avoiding such problems
may Fx~ critical to maintain bank asset yuality. "fhis paper has partly tilled this gap by
incorpcxating elements from the literature on collusion in hureaucracies (see Tirole (1992) for
an overview) in the theory of banking. The paper has analyzed a model in which the low-
Z~~ Thakur (19931 surveys tfx; reu;nt corporate lirunce lilerature un intra-tirtn irn;entive prnblemx.yuality borruwer tnay want to colludc with [he loan ofticer in order to bc granted a loan [hat
is unprutitable fiir the bank. To increase bank prolit, the bank must tind an ef~ticient way to
cope with cullusion. For reasons explained in the introductory section it may be costly to
prevent collusion by making the loan ofticer's wage contingent on the protit that is ultimately
carncd on thc loan (FTolmstriim (1979), Shavell (1979)). The pape;r explains the role the credit
committee could play in coping with this agency problem. It shows why, in practice, banks
that have a credit committee typically set a dollar amount above which all loans must be
approved by the committee, and that delegation may help to avoid a commitment problem
asstN:iated with a check by the credit committee.
"I'he modern theory of fin~mcial in[ermediation makes two related predictions about scale
effects in banking tirms: l.arge banking tirms will be less likely to fàil und more cost efticient
than small banking tirms. However, Boyd and Runkle (1993) tind no empirical evidence that
large banking tirms are less likely to fail than are smaller ones. In fact, ex post evidence
shows that in recent years large US banking firms have failed somewhat more often.
Although my paper does not deal with the relation between bank size and profits, it shows
that a larger bank organization, in which the bank owner delegates the credit function to loan
officers, may suffer from internal incentive problems that would not occur if the bank owner
himself would tx involved with loan production.'~ Differences in the way in which banks
organizc thcir lending activities and in their abilities to cope with internal agency problems
may explain why some banks are more successful in exploiting the returns to scale ot' their
activitics than are other hanks, and why in similar economic environments some banks fail
whcrcas other hanks flourish.
Appendix
Zt Scc al.ai Mestcr (IiXII) anJ Nekamura (1993). Millun atxl Thakor (1985) prcu~nt a mtxlel of injnrmation
AaUtrrirt~; oAnnriec (IGA'z), c.g. creJit rating age~x;icx, finetxial newsletters etc., in which an IGA that is larger (has
mure empluycesl"scrcening agenrti") is able tn pnkess morc infittmation aMw[ inclividual invcstments, xs empluycex
sh:uc intiirmation. ~fherc is a Bee-rider prohlcm, huwevcr, becauu; cmployees' et7~nrt Icvcls are wx~urvable. Gnwp
liirmation woru:ns the uuveriry of this mural hararJ prublem, hecause iixlividual employees are cumpen5atecl contíngern
un lhe result ul the c(fixt of all gnwp memhcrs. "Ilxreforc uptimal IGA size will gerx~rally tx~ finite.24
Proof of Protx)sition t~ Thc principal maximius bank protit (7), subject to wn ? 0 and 0 5 tr
- l. Pirst we show that in eyuilihrium we will have tc ~ ti . Considcr wc~Ox), see (6). If
us(fx)-tcP G 0, or eyuivalenlly tc ~ tc~ (see (8)), onc has wi~(tt) - 0 hy (6); the loan ofticer's
individual rationality constraint is binding. The principal can increase his protit by lowering
tc to ti and keeping w„(tc) cunstant at zero; this reduces the cost of checking and still
prevents collusion. Theret2ire in eyuilibrium tc 5 tc~ and wi;(p) - as(tc)-tiP ? 0. Given tt S
tc~, (7) can be rewritten as
n - RI - ( I-I ~)pC - (1-q)I'~cxs(tc)-tcP~ - R1 - pM - (tt))1 ~wn~(0)
where M - (1-I')C - ( I-y)I'P - (1-y)I'w~{(0).
It M G 0[hc principal maximizcs protit by picking thc itighe~t tc ~ ti and choosing Ihe
corresponding wage wii(tc); if M? 0 the principal optimally chooses the lowest W? 0.
It cnn tx checked easily that M G 0 if and only if I 1 h. So we have
a) If I 5 It, the principal prefers to set tc as low as possible (p - 0) and picks wc, - wij(0) to
prevent collusion.
h) It I~ h, the principal optimally picks tc - tc~ and wc, - wg(p~) - 0.
It is easy to check that the principal's protit (7) is positive and increases with I. Q.E.D.
Proof of Prop~tic2lL~~ Tu prove the proposition, detine
t. ~ ~l-I.~t,
I, - - - - -
~'h~,r~, (~-y)l~cX Pala'-rc,)
It is easy to check that 1, ~ max~h,l~~ 'fhe principal has two options availaMe. The first is to
Plck (wic, tc) -(w„~(0), 0). In that case the principal prevents collusion withou[ a check. His
protit is given hy (7). t3y Proposition l, [his strategy will certainly Ix~ optimal tiir t ~ 1~. '1'he
second option is to allow some collusion in eyuilibrium: tx ~ 0, so wn G wg(0). [f the
principal picks wR c wc~(0), the optimal choice is wc; - 0. It follows from subsection 4.2
that the Bayesian equilibrium of the collusion game is given by (lx~,c~). Moreover, subsection
4.2 explains that this strategy will never be optimal tor f 5 li (see ( 10)). Given I~[~, the
principal's protit when picking w„ - 0 G wy(0) is given by`Z
z, A nNlfl' ~,l'nl'fAI CEI1fCtitilUn OI Ihl' t1flnCljlal~ti t1fOÍIl, glVl'n WII - t), ~~
a- RI - 11-17RC -(t-i01'R~I(I ti~)(I-f~,r,Jl t tiCl
By (y), thix ix cquivalcm ~u (t4).25
n-- RI (I-y) I c~(t Pi,r,~ll (14)
"1'his is nunncgative and incrcasing in 1 tiir all a' c I, by (4). 'I'he principal picks the protit-
maximizing strategy.
a) As cxplaincd, (w~t',tt~) -(w„((1),0) fi~r I' max~Ii,l`~. If I 1 max~li,h~, Ihe principal
prefers (wr,~,tti) -(wH(0),0) if and unly if (7) excceds ( l4). It is easy to check that this is the
casc if and only if ! 5[z.
h) Pur 1~ IZ, (14) exceeds (7). It is easy to check that the loan officer's individual ratiunality
constraint holds, given ci and )i.'' Q.E.D.
Z~ Thc luan ofliccr's individual ratiunality constraint is given by
E(w,a,p) - (I-wI'a~(as-p~ f (I-wl'(lá)wn? w
If (ÍZ) holJx. lhis rcduccs tn h(w) -(I-y)f w~~' D.26
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